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BEPS Action 4 focuses on excessive deductible interest and other financial payments, thus recommending the design of rules in order to prevent base
erosion through the use of interest payments and double non-taxation both from an inbound and an outbound perspective.
This article deals with some relevant questions related to this topic, such as the grounds for justification, the limitations based on classification
and the financial expenses related to exempted income, with special reference to some relevant experiences and case law in the European Union.
Taking into account that some tax jurisdictions have enacted provisions in this respect, the authors also analyse some comparative examples as well as
the main concerns related to legal principles and taxpayers’ position and Tax Treaty issues.
1 INTRODUCTION. BEPS ACTION 4: ISSUES
AND PERSPECTIVES
The main issue expressed in Action 4 focuses on ‘excessive
deductible payments such as interest and other financial
payments’ and the main goal is preventing from the risk of
double non-taxation. The meaning of ‘excessive’ interest
remains to some extent unclear: ‘excessive’ related to
what? Who decides what and in which circumstances is
the interest ‘excessive’?
The concern about double non-taxation is not new. IFA
dealt with this subject in the Vienna Congress (2004),1
but BEPS has enhanced this concept which is meant to be
a new international tax standard and, as such, expressly
included in the Preamble of the OECD MC.2 But it is
obvious that, in the present situation, double non-taxation
is in most cases the result of mismatches resulting from
domestic legislation in the residence and the source
country, combined with the allocation rules in the Tax
Treaties and it will be hypocrite or naïf to pretend that
double non-taxation is always the intention and result of
‘aggressive’ tax planning. Tax policy measures and
moreover, harmful tax competition have also very much to
do with this problem.3
Regarding its justification, Action 4 refers to base
erosion and profit shifting caused by the deduction of
interest in two different perspectives:
First, the inbound perspective: ‘Lending from a related
entity that benefits from a low-tax regime, to create
excessive deductions for the issuer without a
corresponding interest income inclusion by the holder.’
Three main features arise from this perspective,
according to its wording: it refers only to intra-group
transactions (‘related entity’); the problem is the effect of
aggressive tax planning (intention: ‘to create’); the result is
double non-taxation (‘without the corresponding income
inclusion’). But there are some pending questions, such as:
is low taxation also included? The bilateral picture seems
to deal with the mismatch arising from domestic
legislation, although it may also affect Tax Treaty issues.
Transfer pricing rules may also be affected, although this
perspective does not deal with arm’s length but with
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1 See: ‘Double non-taxation’ (General Report byM.Lang) Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International, vol.89a. International Fiscal Association 2004. Published by Sdu
Fiscale&Financiële Uitgevers.
2 The recent document on Action 6, about the ‘Clarification that tax treaties are not intended to be used to generate double non taxation’, proposes the addition in the
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of third States)’. See: OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project ‘Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances’ (Action 6: 2014
Deliverable), Section B.
3 As it has been pointed out in this respect ‘MNE tax avoidance is just the flipside of harmful tax competition’ H. Ault, W. Schön & S.E. Say ‘Base Erosion and Profit
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double non-taxation. Anyhow, we must bear in mind that
this is only soft-law, so interpretation shall focus on the
future provisions implementing this Action.
Second, the outbound perspective: ‘Use debt to finance
the production of exempted or deferred income thereby
claiming a current deduction for interest expense while
deferring or exempting the related income’.
Regarding this perspective, some main features arise
from the wording: the reference to ‘exempted or deferred
income’ means that the result will either be double non-
taxation or a time mismatch; it does not refer to related
parties; the reference to ‘related income’ has a broader
meaning including not only interest but any other kind of
income (i.e., dividends), as long as this income has been
obtained because of debt financing; the intentional
element of aggressive tax planning (‘use debt’) is unclear.
Also in this case, interpretation shall focus in the future
provisions implementing this Action.
In order to counteract both situations, the Action
proposed is:
Develop recommendation regarding best practices in
the design of rules to prevent base erosion through the
use of interest expense, i.e. through the use of related-
party and third-party debt to achieve excessive interest
deduction or to finance the production of exempt or
deferred income.
It seems obvious that such rules should be implemented
through domestic legislation taking into account both
perspectives (inbound and out bound), although the
wording of the proposal shows an unclear mixture of both
perspectives; the type of taxpayers (related or third parties)
as well as the objective of avoiding double non-taxation
should also be considered.4 Moreover, ‘prevent base
erosion’ also means reinforce corporate tax revenue, which
indicates that the principle of sound public finance as well
as the fairness of the tax system are the ultimate goals
underlying this Action.
The coordination of Action 4 with other Actions is
expressly referred to: transfer pricing (related party
financial transactions), hybrids (Action 2) and CFC rules
(Action 3). In our view, the connections are quite clear,
especially in the case of transfer pricing and CFC; the
question is why not with Action 5, as long as preferential
tax regimes may also affect the deductibility of interest.5
Apart from that, it should be clear the meaning and scope
of ‘coordination’ because in this respect, there are at least
two different aspects: First, the possibility of a kind of
‘multiuse’ measure; for instance, a concrete measure could
serve to prevent aggressive tax planning both
counteracting excessive interest deduction and the use of a
hybrid instrument. Second, coordination also means
compatibility and consistency with other measures; for
instance, the so-called secondary adjustments as a result of
transfer pricing rules (we will deal with this point later).
About the scope of Action 4, Brauner thinks that ‘This
Action shows more promise than Action 2 and a higher
likelihood of collaborative solution’.6 We agree with this
view in the sense that as we will see later, limitations on
the deductibility of interest is not a new question and
depends mainly on domestic measures but, precisely for
this reason, collaboration is unclear except in a
supranational scenario such as, for instance, in the
European Union, the proposed amendment to the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive.7
Calderón and Martín are very critical because of the lack
of clear concepts (‘excessive interest’), objectives (anti-
abuse/debt-equity) and connection with hybrids and arm’s
length.8 In our view, it is quite evident that in BEPS there
is a lack of a solid conceptual background and sound and
well defined principles (for instance: which are those ‘new
International Tax Standards’ apart from avoiding double
non-taxation as the new and explicit objectives of the Tax
Treaties?9) but, to some extent it is useless and unnecessary
to look for clear concepts in every word of an Action Plan
as if it were a provision already enacted.
For the time being, the OECD has delivered reports on
several Actions (the 2014 Deliverables),10 but Action 4
will be included in the next package to be delivered before
September 2015.
Taking into account that the limitations on the
deductibility of interest is not a new question, we will next
deal with its justification and the two different kind of mea-
sures that have been or can be implemented in this respect.
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2 LIMITATIONS ON THE DEDUCTION OF INTER-
EST
2.1 Grounds for Justification
Restrictions on the deduction of interest are increasing
due to a change of tax policy in several tax jurisdictions
which have enacted specific provisions in this respect.
Apart from the recent concern on base erosion and profit
shifting, several justifications, such as neutrality (debt/
equity), anti-abuse and sound public finance, can back this
type of provisions.
The new provisions resulting from implementations of
Action 4, similarly to the current provisions, could either
combine all these justifications or be more focused in one
of them (i.e., avoid double non-taxation). It will depend
on the scope and content of the relevant provision, that
will have to be interpreted according to its motivation; the
connection with common justification with other Actions
(i.e., Action 2 on Hybrids) will also have to be taken into
account.
For the time being, most tax jurisdictions have tried to
solve the problem of how limiting the benefits of debt
characterization, by enacting and implementing two type
of solutions that, through two different ways, look for the
same result: the no deduction of interests.
The first way is what we would call an indirect solution,
mainly based on the classification of the interest as a
dividend and in this group, the thin cap rule, as well as
secondary adjustments in transfer pricing, are the most
extended and significant measures, but normally
applicable to related entities. In most cases, they can be
clearly identified as anti-avoidance provisions that try to
fight aggressive tax planning schemes based on the benefit
of debt characterization when financing entities within the
same group.
The second way is a direct solution, by means of
provisions that keeping the classification of interests as
such, simply deny or restrict its deduction. These
provisions may have a limited scope, when only applicable
to related entities and/or with an anti-avoidance purpose,
but also a more general scope, if applicable to any kind of
entities whether related or not and irrespective any abuse
purpose of the taxpayer entity.
The justification for this direct solution is a very simple
but at the same time, in our view, a right statement
according to which ‘Interest is a deductible expense and,
as such can be subject to restrictions and limitations as all
business expenses can be’ (Brown).11
It is, in principle, evident that not every business
expense or cost is deductible for tax purpose, because the
tax base is not necessarily identical to the net result of the
profit and loss account and this can be said irrespective
the system chosen by the tax legislator. Even in the cases
of Corporate Tax legislations that, in principle, refer to
that account for the calculation of the tax base, its
provisions will regulate adjustments to the initial amount
for some expenses (such as gifts, penalties or certain
provisions) which may be considered non-deductible even
if they represent and actual and effective cost.
In general, this has not been the case for the interest
which, traditionally, has always been considered a
deductible expense (this is precisely the problem, when we
compare this situation to the one of the dividend). But
however, we can find examples of non-deductible interests
in some specific cases that have nothing to do with the
problem of debt-equity. We are referring to tax
legislations that, even having implemented a very similar
tax treatment for subsidiaries and permanent
establishments (PE) (including the calculation of the tax
base), still retain some differences and one specially
relevant is that the interests paid by the PE to the head
company are not deductible (while the interests paid by
the subsidiary to the parent company are deductible).12
As already mentioned, a first ground for justification is
neutrality. Debt vs. equity which, at the income level,
means interest vs. dividend has always been a relevant
issue and a major concern in the field of taxation.13 To
some extent, this could be considered a never ending story
and a frequent matter of conflict between the Tax
Administration and the taxpayers (in most cases,
companies integrated in multinational groups).
Precisely because this is a global and everlasting
problem, several and different solutions have been
proposed.14 Most of them remain at the theoretical level or
have been presented by Governments and International
organizations as documents on tax policy proposals. Just to
mention some of these, we can refer to: the Comprehensive
Business Tax (CBIT) which would imply denial or
restriction both on interests and dividends (US Treasury
1992); the deductibility of interest based on the
relationship between risk and return (Polito, 1998); the
Business Enterprise Income Tax (BEIT) which proposes an
allowance for cost of capital, denying the deduction of
interests and dividends at the entity level, not taxing them
at the recipient level (Kleinbard, 2007); unlimited
deduction for interests and dividends, taxing the retained
earnings at the entity level (Warren 1981, Avi-Yonah
Notes
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13 That was one of the main subjects in the IFA Congress 2012 in Boston: ‘The debt-equity conundrum’ (General Report by P. Brown) Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International,
volume 97 b, Sdu The Netherlands 2012.
14 See: Peter H. Blessing, ‘The debt-equity conundrum. A prequel’ on Bulletin for International Taxation, April/May 2012, pages 198–212.
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2010); the Allowance for Corporate Capital (ACC) based
on a deduction for the risk-free return on capital whether
from debt or equity, but thus denying the deduction both
of interests and dividends (IMF 2011). Also encouraged by
the IMF, the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) is a
different proposal, which in part consists in the current
situation, based on the deduction of interests but not of
dividends, allowing a deduction on the amount of the
corporate equity; this system has been enacted in a few tax
jurisdictions.
In recent years, some countries such as Belgium and
Italy have enacted provisions based on the ACE system.15
Just to summarize: neutrality when financing an
enterprise requires a similar treatment of debt and equity
which, at the income level, means same treatment of
interest and dividend; this can be achieved either declaring
both deductible or non-deductible. The two ways for
neutrality have been proposed in the different alternatives
above mentioned but in this respect, we may conclude
that the principle of neutrality can back a provision
limiting the deductions of interests, but also that
neutrality can be achieved not only and exclusively by
means of that limitation.
The second ground for justification is anti-abuse
legislation trying to counteract the debt bias. In this
respect, it can be said that the indirect solution based on
the reclassification of interest as dividend has not worked
properly; to some extent, we are facing a relative failure of
the thin capitalization provisions. At the EU level, this is
in part due to the European Union Court of Justice
doctrine, in a first step, by its decision in the Lankhorst-
Hohorst case; in a second step, by the most precise doctrine
set out in the Thin Cap case.
Also in line with the prevention of abuse, we must refer
that another justification directly linked to the new
international tax standard proposed by BEPS and precisely
expressed in Action 4 is the need to avoid double non-
taxation.
In the following points we will deal with the two last
questions, based on the experiences both with limitations
based on classification and to financial expenses related to
exempted income.
Last but not least, a third ground for justification is
linked to the principles of sound public finance and
fairness of the tax system (i.e., ‘fair share’ by MNEs),
which may legitimate provisions of this kind, which tend
to prevent base erosion in Corporate Tax. The challenge in
this case is to find a fair balance between the public
interest (revenue) and a fair tax burden on the taxpayer,
according to the principles of ability to pay and equality.
2.2 Limitations Based on Classification
The indirect solution of the debt bias can be either the
result of classification in a particular case or of specific
anti-abuse legislation, such as the thin capitalization
provisions.
Classification on a case by case basis is not effective as a
general solution, because the result will depend on a final
Court decision. We refer as an example, the US Tax Court
decision given by Judge D. Kroupa in the Scottish Power
case in 19 June 2012; the IRS had challenged 932 million
dollar in interest deduction, considering that the related
debt had to be treated as equity, but the Court ruled that:
‘…there are in this case pointing to both debt and
equity ... nevertheless in view of the record as a whole, we
find that the advance was more akin to debt than equity’
and therefore held that ‘the payments of interest made
with the respect to the loan notes are deductible for each
year at issue’.
In most countries, specific provisions focused on the
concept of thin capitalization have been enacted, the result
being the no deduction of the excessive interest. In our
view, whether this interest is expressly reclassified as
dividend or not is irrelevant, because the result (no
deduction) is the same and it can be considered that
classification is the underlying idea, in the sense that the
excessive debt is considered as ‘disguised’ equity. As
already mentioned, we are now facing a relative failure of
this type of provisions, especially in the European Union,
due to the ECJ doctrine in this respect. In view of future
provisions implementing BEPS Action 4, some lessons can
be learnt from this experience.
It is well known that the ECJ decision on the Lankhorst-
Hohorst case (C-324/00, 12 December 2002), declared the
German thin cap rule contrary to the freedom of
establishment because of the ‘difference in treatment
between resident subsidiary companies according to the
seat of the parent company’, rejecting three possible
justifications: First, the protection of the tax revenue,
because according to the Court’s doctrine ‘does not
constitute an overriding reason in the public interest
which may justify a measure which is in principle contrary
to a fundamental freedom’. Second, the risk of abuse
because that provision ‘does not have the specific purpose
Notes
15 See. EU Commission, ‘Adressing the Debt Bias. A Comparison between the Belgian and the Italian ACE Systems’. Working Paper n. 44, 2014. According to the Belgian
system (2006), a corporation is granted a deduction against the Corporate Income Tax base equal to the product between the (adjusted) equity, the ACE base, and a given
notional rate, the ACE rate. This regime is applicable both to resident and non-resident companies with a PE in Belgium and antiabuse provisions apply, In Italy (2011), the
ACE is a deduction against the Corporate Income Tax base meant to approximate the cost of equity, calculated by applying a notional interest rate to a net equity base, the
ACE base, defined on the net positive variation of equity as for the end of 2010. The regime applies to resident and non-resident companies with a PE in Italy.
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of preventing wholly artificial arrangements designed to
circumvent the German tax legislation, from attracting a
tax benefit, but applies generally’. Third, the coherence of
the tax system because the Court considered that there was
not a direct link between the deductibility in the
subsidiary company and the taxation of the parent
company.
The decision on the Lankhorst-Hohorst case led to
different reactions by the Member States, from (the most
common) consisting in applying their thin cap provision
also in purely domestic situations, to the opposite (i.e.,
Spain since 2004), consisting in declaring that the thin
cap rule does not apply within the European Union.
According to most scholars (and this is our view too) that
reaction of the Spanish legislator was disproportionate and
not very logical, apart from arising other problems, such as
the possible use of conduit companies located in Spain,
thus circumventing the thin cap rules retained in other
Member States, or the discrimination of third countries.
Precisely in this respect, the Tribunal Supremo (Spanish
High Supreme Court) in its decision of 17 March 2011 on
the Hero case (a Swiss company),16 based on Article 24.1
(non-discrimination) of the Tax Treaty (DTC) between
Spain and Switzerland, stated that the former thin cap
provision17 could not apply in this case, because
companies resident in Switzerland have the right to the
same tax treatment as companies resident in Spain.
The decision on the Thin Cap Litigation Group case (C-
524/04, 13 March 2007), set out a more precise doctrine
with two relevant elements: First, connecting the
compatibility of the thin cap provisions with the freedom
of establishment with the Court’s doctrine on abuse of law.
Second, determining the limits of the classification
according to the principle of proportionality which in this
case, means to put these limits within the framework of
the arms’ length principle.
Therefore, a thin cap provision as long as it applies to
the interest of a loan directly or indirectly granted by a
company resident in another Member State is in principle,
an obstacle to the freedom of establishment prohibited by
the Treaty, unless: first, the provision contains objective
elements identifying purely artificial arrangements and
the possibility for the taxpayer to justify commercial
justification and second, if abuse is proved, the
classification of the interest as a dividend will be only in so
far it exceeds the amount due according to arms’ length
principle. This doctrine was further invoked in the Court’s
decision on the NV Lammers & Van Cleeff case (C-105/07,
17 January 2008).18
In Spain, the arms’ length test as a limitation to the
effects of the thin cap provision was also followed by
the Tribunal Supremo in its decision on the Hero case above
mentioned. The Court argued in base of Article 9 of the
OECD Model Convention, stating that the compatibility
of the national thin cap provision with Article 9 requires
the proof by the Tax Administration that the benefits
obtained have been higher than those that would have
been obtained according to the arms’ length principle. In
the Netherlands, the Hoge Raad in its decision of 21
September 2011 held that the Dutch thin cap provision
which denied the deductibility of interest related to
excessive debt (3 to 1 debt/equity ratio) was consistent
with Article 9 of the relevant Tax Treaty.
The consistency of the provisions limiting the
deductibility of interest with the arm’s length principle is
in our view, a major issue, especially when dealing with
Article 9 of the Tax Treaty as we will see later on, but also
in general, in the cases of domestic transfer pricing
provisions which apply the so-called secondary
adjustment, that is to say, classification as dividend of the
excessive interest according to that principle.19 This type
of adjustment shows that transfer pricing provisions also
have an anti-avoidance objective, as far as the excess of
interest (according to arm’s length) is considered as a
hidden dividend.
To summarize: from a EU Tax Law perspective, thin
capitalization as a targeted anti-avoidance rule can be, in
principle valid and compatible with the Treaty but its
application must be proportionate according to an arms’
length test
2.3 Financial Expenses Related to Exempted
Income
Double non-taxation has been targeted by BEPS and
counteracting this effect is one of the major issues
addressed in the Action Plan. As we have already
mentioned, the rule expressly recommended by Action 4 is
to deny the deduction of interest related to exempted
income. Moreover, recent EU initiatives have moved in the
same direction.
But just ten years ago, this was not the case. In EU Tax
Law, the Parent / Subsidiary Directive was aimed to
Notes
16 Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Contencioso) 1825/2011, 17 Mar. 2011.
17 Article 20 Corporate Tax Act (abrogated in 2012).
18 On 6 Jun. 2012, the South Central Administrative Court (Portugal) has requested from the ECJ a preliminary ruling regarding the non-deductibility of interest on excessive
debt towards an entity of a non-member country with which special relations are maintained.
19 Such as, for instance, Art. 16.8 of the Spanish Corporate Income Tax Act, according to which in cases of difference in favor of the shareholder, this amount, in proportion to
the share, will be considered as participation in the profits of the company.
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correct double taxation, both economic (by either
imputation or exemption system on dividends in the State
residence of the parent company) and legal (by exemption
on dividends in the State of source) and the same objective
had the Directive on Interest and Royalties between
associated companies (elimination of legal double taxation
by exemption of interest in the State of source). But none
of these two Directives prevented from double non-
taxation; this seemed not to be an issue at that time and
the Bosal case illustrates that situation.
The ECJ decision on the Bosal case (C-168/01, 18
September 2003) dealt with a Dutch provision that did
not allow the deduction of the so-called participation costs
of a holding, unless they were related to profits taxable in
The Netherlands. The problem in this case was connected
with the Parent/Subsidiary Directive (90/435), because as
far as the dividends from the subsidiaries in another
Member State were not taxed in the State of the parent
company, the interest paid by this company as
participation cost in its subsidiaries, did not meet the
requirement for being deductible according to that
provision.
It must be taken into account that the Directive in its
Article 4, after granting the exemption or a tax credit in
the State of residence of the parent company on the profits
distributed by its subsidiaries resident in other Member
States (paragraph 1), declared that ‘each Member State
shall retain the option of providing that any charges
relating to the holding and any losses resulting from the
distribution of the profits of the subsidiary may not be
deducted from the taxable profits of the parent company’
(paragraph 2). Based on this provision, The Netherlands
and UK Governments, as well as the Commission, argued
that ‘it is lawful for Member States to provide that costs in
relation to holdings are not in any way deductible from
the taxable profits of the parent company’.
The Court accepted this argument and thus declared the
limitation in principle, compatible with the Directive, but
stating at the same time that the possibility referred in
Article 4.2 ‘may be exercised only in compliance with the
fundamental provisions of the Treaty’ and therefore, a
provision like the one in the case at hand, which limits the
deductibility of costs incurred by the parent company
when the related profits are distributed by the subsidiaries
in other Member States ‘constitutes a hindrance to the
establishment of subsidiaries in other Member States’ and
moreover, goes against the objective of the Directive,
which is to eliminate the tax disadvantages in the relations
between parent companies and subsidiaries within the EU.
Also in this case, the Court rejected the justifications
based on the coherence of the tax system (no direct link
because parent and subsidiaries are different legal persons
and neither between the cost of the parent and the
potential taxable profits of the subsidiaries), territoriality
(no such an exception in the Directive), and avoiding the
erosion of the tax base (for this is a justification similar to
the risk of diminution in tax revenue, that has been
traditionally rejected by the Court as a matter of
overriding general interest).
The Court finally declared contrary to the freedom of
establishment:
a national provision which, when determining the tax
on the profits of a parent company established in one
Member State, makes the deductibility of costs in
connection with that company’s holding in the capital
of the subsidiary established in another Member State
subject to the conditions that such costs State where the
parent company is established.
It is interesting to note that the Dutch provision fell
under Treaty freedoms and not as a result of the
interpretation of the Directive and this may be the reason
why some authors think that the Bosal doctrine would be
an inconvenient in order to implement provisions of that
kind within the EU 20 but, in our view, things may change
if a specific provision aiming to avoid double non-
taxation, were included in the Directive and thus
implemented by national legislations in all Member
States.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the Parent
Subsidiary Directive applies to cross-border situation,
when the parent company and its subsidiary are located in
different Member States. In the Bosal case, although the
exemption on the dividends from EU subsidiaries was an
effect of that Directive, the problem arose in a domestic
situation referred to the Corporate Tax base of the Dutch
parent company: the financial expenses were not
deductible because the related income (dividends from EU
subsidiaries) was not included in that base.
In other words: the risk of double non-taxation in cases
of interest deductible related to exempted income, can be
either arisen in a purely domestic or in a cross-border
situation. Both cases have to be solved by changes in the
domestic legislation, but in the cross-border cases,
especially within the EU, the national provisions could be
uniformly adopted by way of implementation of a
Directive.
Recently, the Council Directive amending Directive
2011/96 /EU on the common system of taxation
applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries
of different Member States21 includes as new wording in
Article 4.1.a): ‘refrain from taxing such profits to the
Notes
20 See J. Hay, ‘Base erosion…’.
21 Council Directive 2014/86/EU of 8 Jul. 2014.
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extent that such profits are not deductible by the
subsidiary of the parent company’.22 This provision tries
to avoid economic double non-taxation focusing in the tax
treatment of the dividends in the State of residence of the
parent company; therefore, it is not a provision aiming to
deny the deduction of interest. Obviously, one may think
that dividends are not deductible as a general rule, and if
this were the case, it would be either a result of specific
provisions in the State of the subsidiary or of hidden
dividends disguised as interest; in other words, we are
facing here a question related to hybrids, although the
proposal focus on one-side direction.23
The situation is far from being exceptional o merely
theoretical. We can refer as an example the one of the so-
called juros brasileños regarding the dividends paid by
Brasilian subsidiaries to their parent companies and the
related Court decisions in Germany (Federal Court 6 June
2012) and Spain (Audiencia Nacional 27 February 2014).
According to the Brasilian Federal Act (1996, Article
9), the juros qualify as equity and the subsidiary is a
shareholder of the parent company, but the related profits
distributed are called ‘interests’ and are deductible in
order to calculate the tax base of the subsidiary. Article 21
of the Spanish CIT grants a participation exemption
regime for foreign dividends (5% threshold).
In this case, the Spanish Tax Administration considered
that the ‘dividends’ obtained by the Spanish parent
company should be reclassified as interest income and
thus, not being dividends, Article 21 CTA did not apply.
The Court, focused on the relevant provisions of the
relevant Tax Treaty between Brasil and Spain, specially the
concept of dividend (Article 10) and interest (Article 11)
which, according to the Court shall be interpreted
following the rule in Article 3.2, which meant in this case,
according to the Brasilian legislation. Following this
reasoning, the Court considered that the payments
corresponding to the juros qualify as dividends and
therefore, the exemption granted by Article 21 CTA
applied in this case. The Audiencia Nacional expressly
invoked the former decision held by the German Federal
Court on the same case which considered that the juros
qualified as dividends according to the German
legislation.
As far as our topic is concerned, it is important to
remind that Action 4 expressly refers to coordination with
Action 2 on hybrids and one proposal recommended in
this Action is to develop ‘(iii) domestic law provisions that
deny a deduction for a payment that is not includible in
income by the recipient (and is not subject to taxation
under controlled foreign company CFC or similar rules)’.24
The Action also refers the reverse proposal (similar to the
amended Article 4.1.a) of the Parent / Subsidiary
Directive): ‘domestic law provisions that prevent
exemption or non-recognition for payments that are
deductible by the payer’. The recent document delivered
on Action 2, contains specific proposals in both directions,
either denying the deduction of payments in the payer
jurisdiction and/or denying exemption (i.e., dividends) for
deductible payments.25
It seems that these type of provisions address cross-
border situations, the typical case being: payment
deductible in the State of residence of the payer and the
related income exempted in the State of residence of the
recipient. But it must be noted that double non-taxation
could also arise in a purely domestic situation, such as
financial expenses related to exempted income in the same
State; that was the case in Bosal where although the
income came from foreign dividends, both this income
and the related financial expenses were included in the tax
base of the Dutch Corporate Tax.26 In our view, all
situations of double non-taxation should be treated
equally, because they are comparable; otherwise, there
would be a problem of discrimination, especially within
the EU and also in this case, a risk of restriction on Treaty
freedoms.
Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that the ambitious
objective of avoiding double non-taxation, although
formally legitimated by the need to counteract aggressive
tax planning, is not always a result of that planning at all.
More especially, in the case of interest deductible (in State
A) related to exempted income (in State B), double non-
taxation may be the result (not even intended by the
taxpayer) of a mismatch between the legislation of State A
and State B.
From this perspective, either of the two solutions
proposed may be debatable, moreover if the taxpayers in A
and B are not related parties. In the first case, because the
deduction of interest in State A will not be deductible
(more tax burden for taxpayer in A) because of tax policy
measures (exempted income) adopted in State B (benefit
for taxpayer in B). In the second case, because a tax policy
measure adopted by State B (exemption) will not be
applied because of a tax provision (deduction of interest)
adopted by State A. Moreover, these solutions are also
Notes
22 A similar provision is implemented by Art. 21.1.b) of the new Spanish Corporate Tax Bill (published 6 Aug. 2014, Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales).
23 For a critical approach to this proposal, see: H. van der Hurk, Proposed Amended Parent-Subsidiary Directive Reveals the European Commission’s Lack of Vision in Bulletin for
International Taxation, September 2014. IBFD.
24 A provision of this kind is implemented in the Spanish Corporate Tax Bill (Art. 15 j).
25 See: OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project ‘Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements’ (Action 2:2014 Deliverable), Chs 2, 3 and 4.
26 About a general limitation on the deduction of interest on related-party and third-party debt, J. Hey thinks that ‘a targeted solution would only inhibit the deduction of
interest related to tax-exempt or deferred foreign dividends, whereas interest related to domestic tax-exempt dividend would still be deductible, thereby preventing double
taxation’, although the author notes that this could be blocked by ECJ in Bosal. See ‘Base erosion…’.
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debatable from the perspective of the tax jurisdictions
involved, because the effective application of the tax policy
measures adopted by one State will be conditioned by the
tax treatment of the related (income/expense) in the other
State.27
3 THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS
3.1 Some Comparative Examples
As we have already mentioned, some tax jurisdictions have
enacted provisions either denying or limiting the
deduction of interest.28 The content of these provisions
may show differences but their common feature is the non-
deductibility of interest and other financial expenses. In
this respect, the scope may consist either in a limitation of
the amount deductible (the so-called ceiling rule) or in the
denial of deduction, the reference can consist in the profits
(i.e., EBITDA) or in the equity capital and the effects the
no deduction (direct solution) or the reclassification of the
interest (indirect solution). Although not exclusive, these
are the main features of the current provisions enacted in
different tax jurisdictions.
Just to summarize some relevant examples, we can refer
to the German provision which only accepted the
deductibility of the net interest, limited to the 30% of the
EBITDA. The provision is applicable to all kind of
interest, irrespective whether the parties are related and
not conditioned by any arms’ length requirement. The
excess of no deductible interest can be carried forward for
five years. The rule admits some exceptions, such as a net
amount below EUR 3 million or in the case of groups, an
equity ratio higher than the relevant group’s equity ratio.
We want to point out the remark made by the German
reporter: ‘The rule ultimately causes double taxation, as
interest earned is taxable at creditor level, while the
interest expense may not be fully deductible at borrower
level’.29
A similar provision was enacted in Italy in 2008. The
thin cap rule was abrogated and according to the new one
(not applicable to financial entities and individuals) if the
interest expense exceeds the amount of the interest
income, its deductibility is limited to 30% of the benefit
with a carry forward for the no deductible excess. Apart
from this, it must be taken into account that in the IRAP
(a regional business tax, similar to the German
Gewerbsteuer) the interest is not deductible.
In the United States, according to the relevant provision
in the IRC (163 j), taxpayers with a too high debt-equity
ratio or an excessive interest expense, are not allowed to
deduct some or all of their related party interest in the
current year if the related party pays no tax or a lower tax
on the interest income. As the US reporter remarks, the
provision ‘does not confront the status of the instrument
directly, and it does not seek to challenge the taxpayer’s
classification of the instrument as debt. Instead, the
provision accepts the instrument as debt, but then takes
away debt’s most attractive tax feature, the issuer’s ability
to deduct interest’.30 We retain now this remark which in
our view, expresses one of the reasons why some
legislations have moved from indirect solutions (such as
thin cap) to a direct solution (no deduction of interest): a
more pragmatic approach thus avoiding the legal conflicts
related to classification.
The French provision (May 2012) enacted in the CGI
(Article 209.IX)31 had a different content. In this case, the
no deduction of the interest is implemented by recapture
(réintégration) of the financial expenses related to the
acquisition of shares if the amount exceeds EUR 1 million
and the purchasing company cannot by any means
demonstrate that the shares are held by this company or
indirectly by a company resident in France and also, that
the control over the participated company remains in the
hands of a company resident in France. The recapture will
apply in the fiscal year related to that demonstration with
a carry forward of eight years. The pending recapture will
be applied for the subsequent companies in cases of merger
or division.
It seems obvious that the aim of this provision is to
avoid the use of French companies as mere conduit
companies and therefore, this recapture mechanism may
be considered an anti-avoidance rule. But the wording and
effects of the provision, definitely put in a better position
the companies owned and/or controlled by French. In our
view, it seems difficult to accept such a provision from a
EU Law perspective according to the relevant ECJ
doctrine; as it has already been remarked, the recapture
provision ‘tends to demonstrate that the objective pursued
by the legislator is not really the symmetry principle but
rather to make it less attractive for a group of companies
to outsource and relocate functions outside France. It goes
Notes
27 J. Hey has observed that a general non-deductibility and/or reclassification of related-party debt ‘would result in a fundamental change in the revenue distribution between
source and revenue countries’. See ‘Base erosion…’.
28 Some of these provisions were described in ‘The debt-equity conundrum’ supra n. 1. See in this respect National Report Germany (by Fischer), National Report Italy (by
Mamelli) and National Report United States (by Ring).
29 Fischer, National Report Germany, page 319.
30 Ring, National Report United States, page 784.
31 Code Général des Impôts modified by Décret nº 2012-653.
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without saying that such a protectionist objective, which
is directly in conflict with the main purpose of the
internal market, will not elicit the Court’s indulgence’.32
Spain is another tax jurisdiction that moved from
indirect to direct solutions. The Royal Decree 12/2012 of
30 March33 abrogated the former thin cap rule (Article 20
Corporate Tax Act) and enacted two different provisions
(Article 14.1.h) and Article 20) in order to deny and
restrict the deduction of interests and declaring both
provisions applicable since 1 January 2012. These
provisions imply important modifications in the Corporate
Tax Act, more precisely in the rules for the calculation of
the tax base. It must be noted that the aim, scope and
effects of these two provisions are different, because Article
14.1.h) can be considered a special anti-avoidance rule
(SAAR) trying to counteract a concrete scheme of tax
abuse denying the deductibility of the related-parties
interest (intragroup debt) unless the entities prove a valid
economic purpose of the transaction; Article 20, very
similar to the German provision already mentioned, has a
more general scope irrespective any situation of tax abuse
and thus, although implying a limitation, its consequences
are less severe for the taxpayer, because the limitation
consists in a ‘ceiling rule’ of 30% of the so-called net
operational benefit (similar to EBITDA) with a carry
forward (18 years) for the amount not deducted.
In our view, some of these provisions can be considered
as the ‘rules’ mentioned in BEPS Action 4 and from this
perspective, further implementation might not be
necessary. However, it must be reminded that this Action
focuses on anti-abuse and more precisely on double non-
taxation (deduction of interest related to exempted
income), which means that most of the current provisions
may not cover all the goals of Action 4 but also that this
Action does not necessary legitimate all those provisions.
For instance, regarding the Spanish provisions, we think
that Action 4 can back Article 14.1.h) which is an anti-
abuse rule counteracting artificial intra-group financing,
but it is unclear that the general ‘ceiling rule’ in Article
20 could be legitimated by that Action.
Article 14.1.h) of the Spanish CTA declares non-
deductible the financial expenses accrued in the fiscal year
related to debts with entities of the group (according to
Article 42 of the Code of Commerce), irrespective the
residence and the obligation of consolidate their accounts,
if the loan is for the acquisition of shares from other
entities of the group or from any other entities, or for
investing equity capital in other entities of the group,
unless the taxpayer demonstrates that such transactions
have a valid economic purpose.
To some extent, it can be said that this was a tailor-
made provision in order to counteract a certain type of tax
planning scheme which had been identified by the Tax
Administration. The most common and significant
example was the situation of a multinational group
including operating companies in Spain with business
activity and generating profits (the so-called Spanish
subgroup). This being the starting point, a tax planning
scheme was developed through the following steps: First,
the group incorporated in Spain a holding company, which
benefited from the ETVE tax regime.34 Second, the
holding incurred in debt with other companies of the
group (in most cases, the lender companies were resident
in lower tax jurisdictions or enjoying from tax benefits 35);
the loan was for the acquisitions of shares from other
companies of the group (shares held by other holdings of
the group resident in other countries) or either for
investing in equity capital in other companies of the
group; as a result of the big amount of the interests
generated by these loans, the Spanish holding had a
significant loss. Third, the Spanish subgroup opted for the
consolidation tax regime, where the losses of the holding
were offset with the profits of the operating companies.
The final result was obviously, an important erosion of the
tax base of the Spanish subgroup and therefore, a
significant loss of revenue for the Spanish Treasury.
Before the current provision in Article 14.1.h) CTA was
enacted, the Tax Administration challenged this scheme
by applying the GAAR in Article 15 of the Ley General
Tributaria (General Tax Act, GTA). According to this
provision, the Tax Inspector can disregard transactions
clearly artificial or inadequate its main purpose being to
get a tax advantage. In the case at hand, the consequence
would be to deny the deduction of interests by the holding
company and in the end, the taxation of the profits
generated by the operating companies. The TEAC
(Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Central, an
administrative Tax Court), backed the position of the Tax
Administration in some of its decisions 36 and set out the
criteria that must be met for rejecting this type of scheme,
such as: the acquisitions do not mean any actual
investment neither any value added for the group; the
Spanish holding does not perform any functions of
direction or administration in the participated companies;
Notes
32 E. Robert, ‘New Limitations on the Deduction of Financial Expenses Related to Acquisitions’ in European Taxation, May 2012, page 260.
33 Real Decreto-Ley 12/2012, de 30 de marzo (Medidas tributarias dirigidas a la reducción del déficit público). B.O.E.31 de marzo.
34 ‘Entidades de tenencia de valores extranjeros’. (Entities holding securities in foreign companies).The benefits of this special tax regime consist basically in: the profits obtained by
the holding are exempted in the CT and the dividends distributed by the holding company to its non-residents shareholders are neither taxed in the Non-Resident Tax
(NRT) (the resident shareholders also benefit from an exemption on these dividends in the CT).
35 Such as, for instance, the so-called Coordination Centres in Belgium, where the income interests generated by these companies were taxed at a low rate or not taxed at all.
36 TEAC, resoluciones (decisions): 17 May 2007 and 25 Jun. 2009.
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the internal documents of the group show that the
negative results of the holding are only relevant within
the tax consolidation regime, but vis-à-vis third parties,
the external image of the Spanish subgroup, only related
to the benefits of the operating companies, is positive.
However, in another case when the Tax Administration
failed to prove the tax abuse because the acquisitions
were made by a Spanish operating company with the
intention to create an ‘Iberian subgroup’ (together with
Portuguese companies) in order to enlarge their business
activity, although the lender company was a ‘coordination
centre’ of the group resident in a third country,
the Court accepted that there was a valid business
purpose and ruled in favour of the taxpayer (the Spanish
borrower company), thus accepting the deduction of the
interests.37
In our opinion, Article 14.1.h) of the Spanish CTA is
the type of provision that fits within the objectives of
BEPS Action 4, but the correct implementation of this
Action will also require another type of provision, related
to both related and third party debt in order to deny the
deduction of interest related to exempted (and/ or
deferred) income; the future implementation of the
amended Parent/Subsidiary Directive could be a first step
in this direction.
We want to remark that the denial of deduction is a
severe consequence for the taxpayer, legitimated by the
need to prevent and correct the tax abuse scheme, but its
indirect consequence, in the case when the interest income
obtained by the lender company is taxed, will be a double
economic taxation of the interest. In our opinion, this can
be a major problem arising from the provisions which
deny or restrict the deduction of interests that, normally,
do not contain any reference to bilateral adjustment,
probably because in the most usual tax planning scheme
above described, the interest income will not be taxed in
the State of residence of the lender company, but this
reason does not avoid the problem, if the current provision
applies whether the interest income obtained by the lender
is taxed or not. Moreover, in the case of a non-resident
lender, it must be taken into account that this income may
also be taxed in the State of source (legal double taxation).
In fact, the problem can arise from taxation of the interest
income either in the State of residence, in the State of
source or in both.
3.2 Legal Principles and Taxpayer’s Position
The provisions such as the above mentioned, deserve some
comments from the perspective of the legal principles
involved.
The OECD has expressed that ‘While there is a clear
commitment to the fight against BEPS practices, the
changes that will be proposed should not create legal
uncertainty, nor increase the risk of double taxation’.38
These are good intentions but, for the time being, the
current provisions dealing with limitations on the
deduction of interests may arise some questions in this
respect.
First of all, the provisions should be analysed from the
perspective of the principle of legal certainty, which has
always been a major concern, especially when dealing with
anti-abuse rules. The question is: do direct solutions
consisting in the denial or limitation on the deduction on
interest provide legal certainty in order to avoid legal
conflicts in the future? This issue will be analysed later on,
when dealing with the taxpayer’s position.
Another principle to be considered is neutrality. In this
respect, it seems obvious that the provisions which deny or
limit the deduction of interest, approach its tax treatment
to dividends. However, as far as neutrality is concerned,
some remarks can be pointed out. First of all, this type of
provisions can be backed by that principle, but we have to
bear in mind that neutrality in the taxation of interest and
dividend can also be reached by other means. Moreover,
neutrality cannot be properly achieved because of the risk
of double taxation of interest, unless this double taxation
is not corrected; in fact, in the most common case, when
the tax legislation provides complete relief from economic
double taxation of dividends, there will be no neutral
balance in disadvantage for the tax treatment of interests.
The risk of economic double taxation should also be
considered in the provisions related to hybrid
instruments.39
The problem of double taxation of interest, was raised
in the Scheuten Solar Technology case (C-397/09), decided by
the ECJ on 21 July 2011. This case was about the conflict
between a German provision and the Directive 49/2003
on a ‘Common system of taxation applicable to interest
and royalty payments made between associated companies
of different Member States’.
Notes
37 TEAC, decision 1 Jun. 2010.
38 OECD, Explanatory Statement (2014 Deliverables), page 9.
39 In this respect, it has been pointed out that ‘It is not very clear how genuine transactions would escape unharmed, especially in cases in which an advantage is offset twice.
Preferably, recommendation would cover the risk of disadvantages for taxpayers to the same extent as the risk of double non-taxation’ See: O. Popa, ‘Hybrid Entity
Payments-Extinct Species after the BEPS Action Plan?’ in European Taxation, September 2014. IBFD.
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The German provision was the Gewerbesteuergesetz
(Business Tax Act). When calculating the tax base, Article
8.1 provided to add back to the profit ‘half of the
payments for the debts which are connected economically
with the foundation or acquisition of the operation (or part
operation) or a share in the operation or with the
expansion or improvement of the operation or serve the
non-temporary increase of operating capital’, which
means, obviously, that 50% of the interest is not
deductible.
Precisely for this reason, SST argued that this provision
provoked double economic taxation on the interests and
thus it was contrary to Article 1.1 of the Directive which
granted an exemption of the interest payments in the State
of source, the aim of the Directive being the elimination of
double taxation. The Court however, declared that in the
light of a right interpretation, Article 1.1 of this Directive
aims to avoid legal double taxation and at the same time,
its subjective scope is to exempt from tax the creditor, and
not the debtor, so it cannot be extended beyond the
exemption it lays down.
In our view, the reasoning of the Court when
interpreting the Interest & Royalty Directive was formally
right, but the problem raised by this case dealing with the
economic double taxation of interest, remains unsolved.
The Parent/Subsidiary Directive tried to solve both legal
and economic taxation of dividends and the only reason
why the Interest & Royalty Directive only solved the
problem of legal double taxation is simply because as far as
interests (and royalties) are normally deductible, there is
no double economic taxation. Needless to say, this
unsolved problem will become more and more relevant as
long as provisions denying or limiting the deductibility of
interests will spread their influence.
For the time being it is difficult to get a general
conclusion about whether the provisions limiting the
deductibility of interests enacted by different Member
States are compatible with EU Law or not; this is a
question to be solved on a case by case basis, but precisely
for this reason, it can be said that there is not a priori, any
‘red light’ that prevents Member States from enacting this
type of provisions in their tax legislation. In any case, EU
legal constraints will have to be taken into account by
Member States when adopting future provisions
implementing BEPS Action 4.
The risk of double taxation is also connected with
another relevant legal constraint which can substantially
affect the taxpayer’s position: the ability to pay principle.40
The provisions which deny or restrict the deduction of
financial expenses have a direct effect on the final tax
burden and therefore on the fairness of the tax system, so
they have to be confronted with the ability to pay
principle, especially in the tax jurisdictions where this
principle is enshrined in the Constitution. In the case of an
anti-abuse provision, this principle has to be balanced
with the aim of preventing from tax abuse and also it
could be considered that the principle cannot be invoked
in the case of artificial transactions with no economic
substance; however, economic double taxation if effective,
can be considered a breach of that principle. In the case of
a general provision, the approach can be different; for
instance in the cases of a ‘ceiling rule’ allowing a carry
forward compensation for the excess of interest not
deducted, the limitation is not absolute and the risk of
double taxation becomes actually a time mismatch; but
also in this case, the ability to pay principle should be
confronted and balanced with the principles and objectives
that justify the provision.
Last but not least, as we have already seen, in the case of
EU Member States, the provisions limiting the
deductibility of interest, the principles of non-
discrimination and no restriction, as well as ECJ doctrine
on these principles and on anti-abuse provisions, shall be
taken into account.
Coming back to the principle of legal certainty, we will
also refer some of the concerns about the taxpayer’s
position related to the application of the provisions
limiting the deductibility of financial expenses.
The first concern is about the retrospective effect of
these provisions on mid and long-term loan transactions.
We will illustrate this with an example: in 2009, the
parties agreed on a long-term loan, interest were
deductible according to the CIT legislation in force at that
time. In 2012, a new provision denying the interest
deduction was enacted, coming into force in the fiscal year
2012.
In such a case, there is no retroactive effect, because the
provision applies to the taxpayer’s liability in the
subsequent years. However, there is a retrospective effect
on the long-term transaction and in these cases, the main
question is: was the new provision reasonably foreseeable
at the time when the transaction took place?
In this respect, we must bear in mind that the principle
of legal certainty based on legitimate expectation has been
considered a general EU Law principle by the ECJ.41 This
principle has also been invoked by the Constitutional
Court (Germany, Spain) in cases of retroactivity. Moreover,
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
should be taken into account, especially its doctrine on the
‘fair balance’ between the protection of the property right
Notes
40 In this respect, J Hey states that ‘Comparability with the ability to pay principle of taxation of net income involves that, on the one hand, interest expenditure should not be
deducted twice, but on the other, that it cannot be disregarded and must be recognized somewhere. Countries seeking to prevent double non-taxation should, therefore, be
equally aware of not causing double taxation”. See “Base erosion…’.
41 (i.e., cases C-98/78, C-99/78, C-368/89, C-487/01, C-7/02, C-381/07 or C-396/08).
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and the legitimate tax legislation (Protocol 1, Article 1 of
the Convention). According to this doctrine, one of the
conditions of the ‘quality’ of the tax legislation required
by the principle of legal certainty is that the law should
be foreseeable.42 In our view, the retrospective effect of the
provisions limiting the deductibility of interest should be
confronted with that doctrine and also with the principle
of proportionality. However, the situation of the future
provisions that may be enacted as a result of implementing
BEPS Action 4 will be very different from that perspective
because, precisely for the previous knowledge of this
Action, these provisions could be considered foreseeable.
Another concern on the taxpayer’s position is about the
burden of proof, especially in the case of anti-abuse
provisions. These provisions may provide an exception if
there is a valid economic purpose for the transaction but
the taxpayer has to prove this purpose (i.e., Article 14.1.h)
of the Spanish CIT). In our view, the rule on the burden of
proof in this type of provision has to be balanced
according to the principle of proportionality.
In this respect, we can refer the ECJ decision on the
SIAT case (C-318/10, 5 July 2012). This case was about
deduction of expenses related to exempted income in
another Member State. According to the Belgian
legislation (Code Général des Impôts 1992, Article 26),
unusual or gratuitous advantages granted by an
undertaking established in Belgium, those advantages
shall be added to the profits if they are granted to a
taxpayer (or PE) exempted or with a preferential tax
regime in the State where it is established; the
authenticity and the amount of those expenses must be
proved related to genuine and proper transactions and not
exceeding the normal limits.
The Court accepted the justification based on the need
to combat tax evasion and avoidance, but considered that
the provision can be applied without testing the existence
of a wholly artificial arrangement, since it takes only into
account the level of tax imposed on the service provider in
the Member State where the provider is established;
therefore, as it is, a rule that does not meet the
requirements of the principle of legal certainty cannot be
considered to be proportionate to the objectives pursued.
The taxpayer’s position can also be affected by time
limits related to statute of limitation and the audit
procedure.
We will illustrate this with the following example: A
long-term loan transaction was agreed on 2000. In 2007
the Tax Administration initiated an audit procedure on
CIT for the fiscal years 2002–2005; in this procedure the
deduction of interest was not challenged. In 2012, the Tax
Administration initiated another audit procedure on CIT
for the fiscal years 2007–2010 and this time the deduction
was not accepted because, based on application of a
GAAR, the loan was considered an artificial transaction.
Similar cases have been decided by the Spanish High
Supreme Court.43 In this respect, the Court considered if
the Tax Administration agreed to the transaction, without
any change of the circumstances cannot, in subsequent
years, consider that the transaction is abusive and thus
denying the deduction of the related financial expenses.
The Court expressly invoked the principle of legal
certainty and legitimate expectation, as principles that
apply in the relationship between the Tax Administration
and the taxpayer and moreover, considered that an anti-
abuse provision cannot apply to transactions affected by
the statute of limitation.
In our view, the future implementation of anti-abuse
provisions limiting the deductibility of interest, should be
aware of this concern. In this respect, we also think that
other mechanisms in BEPS, such as the one proposed by
Action 12 (mandatory disclosure of tax planning
arrangements) could be a solution for this type of
problems.
3.3 Tax Treaty Issues
As we have already mentioned, according to BEPS Action
4, the most usual scenario of base erosion and profit
shifting by means of interest deduction will be a cross-
border situation. If this is the case and a Tax Treaty
between the States of residence of the debtor and the State
of residence of the creditor applies, some issues have to be
taken into account.44
A general and preliminary question deals with the
compatibility of the domestic anti-abuse provisions with
the Tax Treaty. This is a vexata quaestio that, in spite of the
general declaration in favour of that compatibility
contained in Commentary to Article 1 (paragraphs 9 and
22) is far from being properly solved. The recent
document on BEPS Action 6 contains an interesting
proposal about the inclusion of a saving clause in the
OECD MC which, in our view, would be a good solution
for this problem.45
Notes
42 ECHR, decisions: 14 Oct. 2010 (Shchockin v. Ukrania), 14 May 2013 (N.K.M. v. Hungary), 25 Jun. 2013 (Gáll v. Hungary), 2 Jul. 2013 (R.Sz. v. Hungary).
43 Tribunal Supremo, decisions 4 Nov. 2013, 6 Mar. 2014 and 4 Jul. 2014.
44 The recent document on BEPS Action 2 also deals with the interaction between domestic rules and Tax Treaties. See: OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project
‘Neutralising the effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements’ (Action 2: 2014 Deliverable), Ch. 10.
45 In its recommendation about ‘Application of tax treaties to restrict a Contracting State’s right to tax its own residents’, proposes the addition of the following para. 3 to Art.
1 of the OECD MC: ‘3. This Convention shall not affect the taxation, by a Contracting State, of its residents except with respect to the benefits granted under paragraph 3 of Article 7,
paragraph 2 of Article 9 and Articles 19, 20, 23, 24 and 25 and 28.’ See OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project ‘Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in
Inappropriate Circumstances’ (Action 6: 2014 Deliverable), Section A.
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The first question refers to the consistency of the
domestic provisions limiting the deductibility of interest
with the arm’s length principle and more precisely, with
Article 9.1 of the OECD MC, as far as this provision refers
to related parties and to ‘conditions are made or imposed
in their commercial or financial relations which differ
from those which would be made between independent
enterprises, than any profits which would, but for those
conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but by
reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be
included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed
accordingly’.
The OECD MC Commentary to Article 9.1, in its
paragraph 3 a) states that this article ‘does not prevent the
application of national rules on thin capitalization, insofar
as their effect is to assimilate the profits of the borrower
to an amount corresponding to the profits which would
have accrued in an arm’s length situation’.
In this respect, the Dutch High Supreme Court (Hohe
Raad) in its decision 21 September 2011 held that the
domestic provision on thin capitalization was consistent
with Article 9 of the relevant Tax Treaty. Commenting
this decision, Kemmeren also shares this view on the
consistency, because the Dutch rule refers to the debt/
equity ratio of the group and Article 9 of the Tax Treaty
refers to ‘conditions of a transaction’ which refers to the
individual loan between two related parties.46
Taking into account the OECD MC Commentary above
mentioned which refers to ‘the profits of the borrower’, we
think that an anti-abuse provision denying the
deductibility of interest can be consistent with Article 9.1
of the OECD MC, because an artificial loan between
related parties can be considered a transaction which
would have never taken place between independent parties
and therefore, the tax base of the borrower does not reflect
the profits that would have been obtained under arm’s
length conditions.
In our view, another type of provisions such as the ones
which limit the amount of the interest deductible
according to a ‘ceiling rule’, should also be applied to
related parties in a consistent way with the arm’s length
principle: first, it should be checked whether the interest
paid is according to that principle (which means that
the excess, if any, would not be deductible); second,
the deductible amount should be compared to the ceiling
rule (which means that the excess, if any, should not be
deductible in that fiscal year but, eventually, it could be
carried forward in subsequent years according to the
relevant provision).
A different question arises from the bilateral adjustment
provided for in Article 9.2 of the OECD MC, according to
which ‘The other State shall make an appropriate
adjustment to the amount of the tax charged therein on
those profits’.
In other words: should the creditor’s State reduce the
tax on the interest income if the deductible interest
expense has been reduced in the State of source? In our
view, the answer is clear as far as this reduction is a
consequence of the arm’s length principle, but it is more
debatable if the reduction is the consequence of a provision
which denies or limits the deductibility of the interest
paid by the borrower to a related company, especially if
this limitation applies as an anti-abuse provision. In this
respect, it should be taken into account that OECD MC
Commentary to Article 9.2 in its paragraph 4 states that
the reversal of the burden of proof may not be consistent
with arm’s length principle; moreover, paragraph 11
dealing with MAP in order to solve the bilateral
adjustments, refers that some States may deny this
procedure in case of abusive transactions.
Article 11.6 of the OECD MC also contains an arm’s
length rule applicable to the interest paid between related
parties according to which ‘When the amount of interest,
having regard to the debt-claim for which it is paid,
exceeds the amount which would have been agreed upon
the payer and the beneficial owner in absence of such
relationship, the provision of this article shall apply
only to the last-mentioned amount’. The excess will be
taxed according to the laws of each State, which means: in
the State of residence, accordingly and in the State of
source without the limitation provided for in Article 11.2.
This provision is similar to the one in Article 9.2, but
its effects are expressly connected to the provisions of
Article 11, which means that the excessive interest income
will not benefit from this article and therefore, has to do
with the tax liability of the creditor (lender), but not with
the borrower.
Another issue dealing with Tax Treaties is double
taxation. In point III.2, we referred the risk of economic
double taxation if the deduction of the interest expense is
denied in one State and the related interest income is
taxed in the other State. Moreover, because of the
allocation rules in Article 11 of the OECD MC, there
could be economic double taxation twice: first, the
borrower is not allowed to deduct the interest expense and
the lender is subject to tax on the related interest income
by the State of residence; second, the borrower is not
allowed to deduct the interest expense and the lender is
subject to tax on the related interest income by the State
of source.
For the time being, these situations cannot be solved
within the framework of the Tax Treaty, because Article 23
A and B deal with legal double taxation. The OECD MC
Commentary on the scope of the articles just says that ‘if
Notes
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two States wish to solve the problems of economic double
taxation, they must do so in bilateral negotiations’. In our
view, in the case of related parties, bilateral adjustments
under Article 9.2 would be more reliable, although the
difficulties above mentioned should be considered.
The non-discrimination clause set out in Article 24.4 of
the OECD MC should also be taken into account when
implementing limitations to the deductibility of interest,
as far as according to that provision. ‘Interest paid shall be
deductible under the same conditions as if they had been
paid to a resident of the first-mentioned State’ which
means that a provision limiting the deductibility of
interest only if this interest is paid to a non-resident
company should be considered in breach of the relevant
Tax Treaty.
Limit Base Erosion via Interest Deduction and Others
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